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WASHINGTON DISINHERITS THE
NON-NATIVE WIFEt
James B. Gilchrist*
I. THE PROBLEM
Washington is one of the eight states' which do not follow the general
common law with regard to marital property rights. These eight states
have developed a community property system of marital property
rights which recognizes the contributions of both spouses to the marital
community and rewards both with vested property interests? In Washington, and generally in other community property states, property acquired by either spouse during marriage (other than by gift, bequest,
devise or descent) is community property, and, as such, is vested in both
spouses. The spouse who is not the wage earner gains an ownership
interest in the accumulations of the community simply by being a member of the marital community. On death or other dissolution of the community, the non-acquiring spouse is protected in the distribution of the
accumulated property because he or she is already an owner of one-half
of the communitys property.4
This is in sharp contrast to the forty-two common law jurisdictions,
where title to property acquired during marriage usually vests solely in
the acquiring spouse.5 These jurisdictions have developed a large body
of law, however, designed to protect the non-acquiring spouse, especially
upon dissolution of the marriage by death or divorce. For example, in
1952, thirty-eight of the then forty non-community property states gave
the wife (usually the non-acquiring spouse) a non-barrable interest in
t This article is adapted from a paper submitted to the Pacific Coast Banking School
at the University of Washington (April 1970).
* Member, Washington State and Colorado Bar Ass'n, A.B., Dartmouth, 1961; LL.B.,
Stanford, 1964.
1. The other community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico and Texas.
2. See generally 2 W. Dr FumA, PSIDcNiPLEs oF Coinur
PROPERTY (1943) [hereinafter cited as DE FUmn].
3. Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 15 LA. L. Rav. 640 (1955).
4. Id.
5. H. MARsY, MAXITA, PROPxTy nx ComcT op LAws 29, 51 (1952) [hereinafter
cited as

AsH]; 1 Dz FmAx at 299.
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her husband's real property upon his death,' and in twenty-one of these
states her interest ranged from a one-fourth to a one-half fee ownership.7 In thirty-one of the non-community property states the wife was
given a non-barrable interest in her husband's personal property upon
his death. 8 These forced heirship interests of the wife upon the death of
the husband are often reinforced by restrictions on the husband's inter vivos transfers of his property? Similar rights exist in many of these
states in favor of the husband with respect to property acquired by his
wife.'" Thus, in over three-fourths of our states the wife is protected on
the death of her husband by a right to a forced heirship even when she
was the non-acquiring spouse without an ownership interest in the marital property.
In our increasingly mobile society, married couples often move to
jurisdictions with different marital property ownership systems than
the one under which they previously lived. Since 1900, primarily as a
result of people moving into the area, the Pacific Northwest has grown
at a higher rate than the nation as a whole," and it is estimated that
this population trend will continue through 1980.12 With the large influx
of people, there are many married adults who move to Washington with
an intent to remain and thereby become subject to Washington's marital
property and succession laws.' It is estimated that far in excess of
175,000 people have moved to Washington in the last ten years.' 4 Many

6. MARSH at 40-41. Hawaii and Alaska were territories at the time the survey was
taken.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 42-43.
9. Id. at 34-36; see also Annot., 157 A.L.R. 1184 (1945); Annot., 112 A.L.R. 649
(1938); Annot., 64 A.L.R. 466 (1929). The protection of the non-barrable share is extended to property transferred by the deceased spouse "in fraud" of the surviving spouse's
rights. In some cases, this is found where the decedent used an illusory will substitute.
See, e.g., Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937). In others, the court has
upset transfers where the property was transferred with the intent of defeating the surviving spouse's rights. See, e.g., Ibey v. Ibey, 93 N.H. 434, 43 A.2d 157 (1945), remanded
and appealed, 94 N.H. 425, 55 A.2d 872 (1947).
10. MARsH at 56-58.
11. BATTELLE MEMORIAL INsTITuTE, THE PACIIC NORTHWEST 31 (1967). The Pacific Northwest has grown at a higher rate than the nation as a whole in every decade
except the 1920's and 1950's.
12. Id. It is estimated that the Pacific Northwest will grow at a compound annual
growth rate of 1.68 compared with the national rate of 1.50.
13. That is, become domiciliaries of Washington for the purpose of marital property
and succession.
14. BATTELLE iVEMORIAL INsTiTuTE, THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 31 (1967); WAs5HixGTON
STATE PiAwyiNo and Cownni- AriAms AGENCY, PoPULATioN SERiEs No. 2 (1969);
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of these are married couples from common law jurisdictions who naturally bring with them the property they acquired in the common law
jurisdiction. The prospective Washington couple is in no way advised
that Washington will not treat the couple's existing property in the
same fashion as it treats the property of its present residents, and that
while Washington cannot constitutionally change the ownership of
common law acquired property, it will deny the non-acquiring spouse,
usually the wife, 5 the protection she would have been afforded by her
old state at her husband's death. In short, she is not advised that Washington will disinherit the non-native wife.
The non-native wife is disinherited through a combination of differing marital property rights and the conflict of laws rules used to resolve
the difference between the property rights granted by the old state and
Washington. The change of domicile will not affect the character of the
property which her husband had accumulated at the time domicile
changed. Property which was his separate property under the law of the
non-community property state where it was acquired will remain his
separate property when they move to Washington, regardless of the
nature of the property acquired thereafter in Washington. 16
Since the change in domicile to Washington did not change the nature
of the property, Washington will look to the non-community state
where the property was acquired to determine its character. It will generally be found to be separate property, and Washington law relating
to separate property will then be applied to the marital property of its
new domiciliaries whenever the need arises, generally on dissolution of
the community. The marital property rights of all property subsequently acquired in Washington by the new domiciliaries will be determined by Washington law, and the new property acquired during the
marriage, other than by gift, bequest, devise or descent, will be com7
munity property.
Since the husband and wife are now Washington domiciliaries, Washinterview with Economic Research Department, Seattle-First National Bank,
Washington (1970). In the past decade, Washington experienced a growth of
imately 625,000 with 450,000 representing natural population growth. 175,000 is
migration figure showing the net gain after allowing for those who have moved
15. Throughout this article, the wife will be assumed to be the non-acquiring
although the problem affects whoever may be the non-acquiring spouse.
16. 1 DE FUNiAX at 252.
17. WAs. REv. CoDo §§ 26.16.010-030 (1953).

Seattle,
approxthe net
out.
spouse,
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ington probate and succession laws will apply on the death of either.
The impact at death of the rules used to determine the respective marital property rights of the parties can best be illustrated with the following hypothetical situation: Husband and wife are married and live
in New York for forty years, during which time husband accumulates
$100,000 from his earnings. Husband had an additional $25,000 in
securities when they were married. The $125,000 nest egg is husband's
"separate" property under the laws of New York. Husband retires and
they both move to scenic Washington, bringing the nest egg with them
and becoming domiciliaries. Husband then becomes disenchanted with
wife, predeceases her, and leaves a will disinheriting her as to all
his property. The result is quite simple: the wife is totally disinherited.
The change of domicile did not change the character of the husband's
separate property, and in Washington he is free to dispose of his separate property as he desires. The wife's forced heirship or non-barrable
share protection available in New York is unavailable here because that
is not characteristic of separate property in Washington. Nor do any
community property rights protect the wife as they would if the property had been acquired while they were domiciled in Washington. Had
husband and wife been domiciled in Washington for the forty years,
wife would have owned a $50,000 portion of the nest egg.
The wife would have fared better if her husband had died intestate.
One of the general legislative purposes of the descent and distribution
statutes is to allocate property in the manner in which the "average"
decedent would have intended. In distributing separate property under
this standard, Washington assumes that the average decedent would
want his wife to have at least one-half his net separate estate ($62,500)
if he should die before making a valid will, and she will take more if
no issue, parents, brothers or sisters of the decedent survive him."8
Thus when the two systems of marital property law come into contact
in Washington, the surviving wife loses the protective benefits of both,
and her husband has the option of using his will to deprive her of everything, including what she might have expected had he died without a
will.

18.
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Washington and the Non-native Wife
II.

WASHINGTON'S PRESENT APPROACH

A. Background
A similar problem exists in the other community property states.
Assuming Nevada would follow the case law in the other community
property jurisdictions, all the community property states except California deny the wife the protection she had in her husband's property
before the couple moved to or purchased property in the community
property state.' 9 Community property states have presumptions of
various degrees that all property owned by the new couple in the community state is community property,20 and to the extent that this
presumption cannot be overcome, the new wife gains the protection
of the community property system. All the states allow a tracing of
the funds used to acquire property in the community state back to the
time of original acquisition to determine their character under common
law rules.2 ' Applying community property rules of descent and distribution to property previously characterized as separate elsewhere
destroys any rights the wife had in her husband's property because
separate property in a community property jurisdiction does not carry
with it any protective rights for the wife.'
Legal writers in Arizonaa New Mexico,24 and Texas2 5 have pointed
out that the potential or actual disinheritance in their state is both
unfair and contrary to the philosophy of protection for the surviving
spouse which is inherent in both marital property systems. With a
lengthy legislative effort, California has already succeeded in giving
19. Stephen v. Stephen, 36 Ariz. 235, 284 P. 158 (1930); Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho
336, 125 P. 796 (1912); Tanner v. Robert, 5 La. Rep. 84 (1826), but see Fleming v.
Fleming, 211 La. 860, 30 So. 2d 860 (1947); In re Faulkner's Estate, 35 N.M. 125, 290
P. 801 (1930); Blethen v. Bonner, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 585, 71 S.W. 290 (1902); Lay,
Marital Property Rights of the Non-Native in a Community Property State, 18 HASTINGS
LJ. 295 (1967).
20. See, e.g., LA. Crv. CODE AIN. art. 2401-02 (West 1952); TEx. FAmILy CODE § 5.02
(1969); In re Gulstine's Estate, 166 Wash. 325, 6 P.2d 628 (1932).
21. MARSH at 204-07, 226; Lay, supra note 19.
22. In re O'Connor's Estate, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031 (1933) ; 1 DE FUNIAK at 568.

23. de Funiak, Conflict of Laws in the Community Property Field, 7 ARiz. L. Rav. 50
(1965); Wilkinson, Quasi-Community Property: California's New Property Concept,

6 Ayiz. L. REv. 121 (1964).

24. Werner, Rights of Surviving Spouse in New Mexico in Property Acquired by
Decedent Spouse While Domiciled Elsewhere, 5 NAT. REs. J. 373 (1965).

25. Bucbschacher, Rights of a Surviving Spouse in Texas in Marital Property Acquired

While Domiciled Elsewhere, 45 Tm.Xs L. REv. 321 (1966).

287

Washington Law Review

Vol. 46: 283, 1971

the newly domiciled California wife protection almost as extensive
as that granted under community property concepts to the native
California wife.26
In Washington the problem has generally been ignored. One writer
who mentioned the problem briefly noted the beneficial results intended
by the California Legislature in its efforts to protect the wife and
suggested similar reform in Washington.2 7 However, he pointed out
that California's approach (at that time) of converting separate property into community property on a change of domicile to California
was not only unconstitutional, but would not necessarily promote
family solidarity or be fair to creditors.2 8 It was proposed that reform
in Washington be limited to a local law characterization or derivation
of local property. That is, the rents and profits of Washington property, even if acquired with separate property, could be classified as
community property. This approach had been tried briefly by an early
Washington statute which provided that the proceeds of separate
property during marriage would become community property.2 9 The
statute was repealed two years after its enactment, 0 however, and
shortly thereafter the rents, issues and profits of separate property
32
3
were expressly declared to be separate property " as they are today.
Other than this brief noting of the harsh results established by the
courts, there has been no effort in Washington to explore or resolve
this gap in marital property rights.
B.

The Tracing Concept
The Washington Court has followed the general practice of the
community property states in tracing the funds used to acquire a
Washington asset back to their origin in order to determine the character of the funds at the time they were first acquired. 38 The tracing

§§

26. CAL.. Civ. CODE §§ 140.5-149, 176, 1237.5, 1238, 1265 (West 1961); CA.. PROB. CODE
201.5-201.8, 661, 663 (West 1961); CAL. Rnv. & TAX. CODE §§ 13555, 13672, 15300-

15306 (West 1961). See Section III, text.
27. Horowitz, Conflict of Law Problems in Community Property, 11 WAsH. L. REv.
121, 212 (1936).

28. Id. at 225.
29. P. 67, § 2, [18713 Wash. Terr. Sess. Laws (repealed 1873).
30. P. 486, § 1, [1873] Wash. Terr. Sess. Laws.
31. P. 77, § 1, [1879] Wash. Terr. Sess. Laws.
32

WAsH. RFv. CODE §§ 26.16.010-020 (1953).

33.

See, e.g., Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 P. 914 (1907); In re Gulstine's
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doctrine was applied early in Washington in a creditors' rights situation 4 In determining whether the property which the wife brought
to Washington from Kansas (where it had been her separate property) was insulated from the husband's liabilities, the court stated:
"[I]t was in effect her separate property, and the laws of this state
do not undertake to change the status or liability of such property
merely by its coming across our borders.""5 Fourteen years later the
court was asked to determine the marital property rights in realty
purchased in Washington with the husband's separate money while
both the husband and wife were domiciled in New York. 6 On the
husband's death, the heirs of the wife, who had predeceased her husband, sought one-half of the Washington real estate as her community
property as defined in Washington. 37 The court denied relief, questioning the constitutionality of changing ownership of separate property
38
into community property, and stated:
[P] ersonal property acquired by either H or W in a foreign jurisdiction which is by the law of the place where acquired the separate
property of one or the other of the spouses continues to be the
separate property of that spouse when brought within this state;
and it being the separate property of that spouse owning and bringing it here, property in this state, whether real or personal, received
in exchange for it, or purchased by it if it be money, is also the
separate property of each spouse....
The rule that property acquired in a foreign jurisdiction, which
is there the separate property of one of the spouses, maintains its
separate character when brought into a state having community
property laws, prevails also in California, Texas and Louisiana.
In re Gulstine's Estate39 presented the first case where the domicile
of the parties was changed to Washington. The husband and wife came
Estate, 166 Wash. 325, 6 P.2d 628 (1932); Meyers v. Albert, 76 Wash. 218, 135 P. 1003
(1913); Witherill v. Fraunfelter, 46 Wash. 699, 91 P. 1086 (1907).
34. Freeburger v. Gazzam, 5 Wash. 772, 32 P. 732 (1893).
35. Id. at 773, 32 P. at 733.
36. Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 P. 914 (1907); accord, Stephen v. Stephen,
36 Ariz. 235, 284 P. 158 (1930).
37. BAi.NGR'S AwNOT. CODES AND ST. §§ 4480-4490, the predecessors to WAsHr. Rrv.
CODE §§ 26.16.010-030 (1958). The definitions under both codes make no distinction between domiciliaries and non-domiciliaries at time of acquisition.
38. Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. at 583-84, 90 P. at 915.
39. 166 Wash. 325, 6 P.2d 628 (1932); accord, In re Faulkner's Estate, 35 N.M. 125,
290 P. 801 (1930); Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho 336, 125 P. 796 (1912); Blethen v.
Bonner, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 585, 71 S.W. 290 (1902).
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from South Dakota bringing the husband's separate property with
them. The court found that Mr. Gulstine's property had been separate
under the "law of the place where the same was acquired," and stated
that it would remain separate in Washington "as long as the same
could be directly traced." 40 The court found that since there had been
no effort to keep Mr. Gulstine's property segregated from the community property, only the amount that was still traceable into the
original infusion of separate property into local real estate was still
his separate property.
A recent case summarized these principles as they are applied in
Washington today. In Rustad v. Rustad,41 the court was asked to
determine if a parcel of realty purchased in Washington with the husband's separate property from North Dakota was still his separate
property. No proof of tracing to the source of the funds was presented.
The court reiterated that separate property acquired in a foreign
jurisdiction retains that character when brought into Washington
until it is intermingled with funds accumulated in this state, at which
time it becomes community property. In finding the property to be
community, the court started with the presumption that property
acquired during coverture is community property, and then held that
the burden of proof to show the separate source of funds by tracing
had not been met.
Gulstine and Meyers v. Albert12 are the only Washington decisions
resulting in a denial of property to the wife, and in both cases there
was additional property available to the wife which was not affected
by the characterization of the property in question as separate. The
issue of total disinheritance of a Washington domiciled widow posed
in the hypothetical case above has never been squarely presented to
the Washington court. However, the present case law indicates rather
clearly that, with proof of adequate tracing to a separate source, a
widow could be totally disinherited.
Practically speaking, there are several ways in which the problem
is avoided. When the new couple arrives in Washington, often its ex40. 166 Wash. at 327, 6 P.2d at 630.
41. 61 Wn. 2d 176, 377 P.2d 414 (1963).
42. 76 Wash. 218, 135 P. 1003 (1913).
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isting cash is placed in a joint banking account, its community credit
is pledged to acquire assets, and its obligations are paid with its Washington earnings (community property); in short, its assets become
commingled so that tracing becomes impossible, and the wife is then
adequately protected since all the property would be characterized
as community property under the reasoning of Guistine and Rustad.
The problem may also be avoided through the use of a community
property agreement in which a couple agrees to the "status or disposition" (or both) of its property.43 If they agree that the status of
their existing property is community, then the wife is protected because she is a one-half owner. If they agree to the disposition of
the property, then the wife is protected by what is, in effect, a survivorship agreement.4 5 Because of the contractual nature of the agreement, the husband would need the consent of the wife to be able to
revoke the agreement should he become disenchanted enough to wish
to disinherit her. Neither the husband's subsequent will nor his subsequent insanity will revoke the agreement! 6
The possibility of changing common law acquired property into
community property by commingling or the use of a community property agreement reduces the incidence of the disinheritance problem,
but the conflict of laws approach to the problem followed by the court
still leaves the wife vulnerable where the parties themselves do not
act to convert the property into community property.
Although the Washington court has not articulated the reason for
adopting the tracing concept, one reason would seem to be that the
conflict of laws rule requires tracing. Marital property rights in moveables are generally governed by the law of the domicile of the spouses
at the time of acquisition of the property. 7 Since property rights are
48
not changed merely by taking property from one state into another,
a community property state must look to the state of the property's

43. WAsH. REV. CODE § 26.16.120 (1953).
44. Volz v. Zang, 113 Wash. 378, 194 P. 409 (1920); Neeley v. Lockton, 63 Wn. 2d
929, 389 P.2d 909 (1964); In re Estate of Verbeek, 2 Wn. App. 144, 467 P.2d 178 (1970).
45. In re Wittmann's Estate, 58 Wn. 2d 841, 365 P.2d 17 (1961).
46. In re Brown's Estate, 29 Wn. 2d 20, 185 P.2d 125 (1947).
47. RESTATEMENT OF CoNrLcT O LAWS § 290 (1934); cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
O, CoNI cT O LAWS §§ 258, 259 (Proposed Offidal Draft, 1969). See generally MsARrS.
48. 1 DE FUTAIK at 252; Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 P. 914 (1907).
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prior situs to determine the character of the property when it was
acquired there. At death however, the conflict of laws rule is that succession rights to moveable property are governed by the law of the
last domicile of the decedent. 9 Thus, on death Washington will apply
its own succession laws to the property according to its character in
the foreign jurisdiction. Since any non-barrable share or forced heirship rights of the wife in the common law state are viewed as succession rights, 0 they will not be available to the wife unless the domicile
of the decedent (Washington in this case) grants them. Washington
does not."' Washington will trace the property and find that it was
characterized as separate and then apply its succession laws to the separate property. Whatever protection the wife had under Washington
law or the common law jurisdiction is now lost because the wife's
previous protection was inherent in the common law succession rights
regarding separate property, and in a community property state the
wife has no succession rights in the husband's separate property."2
The hardship imposed by the conflicts rules used to characterize the
property as separate is mitigated if the marriage is terminated by divorce since the Washington courts have authority in divorce cases to
reach separate property in order to make an equitable dissolution. 3 It
is only when the community is terminated by death that the conflicts
rules deny the wife the protection of both marital property systems.
Since she is partially protected if her husband dies intestate,9

4

it is

only when he dies testate that she can be totally disinherited. Even
then an award in lieu of homestead can be set aside for a widow from
either separate or community property, giving her a small degree of
protection.9

49. RESTATEMENT OF CONrLiCT OF LAWS §§ 301, 306 (1934); accord, RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CoNFLIcT OF LAWS §§ 260, 263 (Proposed Official Draft, 1969); see In re

O'Connor's Estate, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031 (1933).
50. In re O'Connor's Estate, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031 (1933). See generally MARsH.
51. In re Gulstine's Estate, 166 Wash. 325, 6 P.2d 628 (1932); see Meyers v. Albert,
76 Wash. 218, 135 P. 1003 (1913) (Washington law applied to Washington real estate
purchased by Oregon decedent).
52. 1 DE FUNmx at 568.
53. Thompson v. Thompson, 56 Wn. 2d 683, 355 P.2d 1 (1960); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.08.110 (1949).
54. See note 18 and accompanying text, supra.
55. WASH. REv. CODE § 11.52.010 (1967) provides that "The court . . . shall award
and set off to the surviving spouse . . . property . . . not exceeding the value of ten
thousand dollars. .. "
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C. Characterizationof Unmatured Assets and Insurance Proceeds
Additional problems are encountered in trying to characterize the
marital property rights which a spouse may have in a specific asset.
When the asset is unmatured, such as an interest in a pension or profit
sharing plan, it is difficult to determine how the community property concepts of Washington should be applied to the asset. 6 Many
new Washington residents who have been transferred to Washington by a corporation will have some fringe benefits which have a
steadily increasing value through continued employment. The better
method 57 of characterizing these unmatured assets, consistent with the
established rules regarding marital property rights, is to characterize
the rights when the property interest becomes vested. Many employee
benefit plans provide for a percentage vesting over a period of years.
Thus it is necessary to determine the extent of vesting which occurred
while the employee was domiciled in each state.
This approach was followed in Colorado in a case in which it was
necessary to characterize the property in question in order to determine
the ownership for taxation purposes.58 The court found that one-half of
the benefits accruing to the husband while the couple was domiciled in
the community property states of Texas and California was fully vested
in the wife, and that her one-half was therefore not subject to Colorado's
inheritance tax on the husband's death.
If the vesting rule followed in Colorado were applied in Washington,
that portion of an employee benefit plan which vests while the couple is
domiciled in a common law jurisdiction would be classified as the separate property of the employee, and any subsequent benefits which become vested in Washington would be termed community property.
Washington uses a similar approach to characterize insurance proceeds. 9 The tracing principle is used to ascertain the separate or com-

56. See Neeley v. Lockton, 63 Wn. 2d 929, 389 P.2d 909 (1964); see also Hughes,
Community Property Aspects of Profit Sharing and Pension Plans in Texas-Recent

Developments and Proposed Guidelines for the Future, 44 TEXAs L. REv. 860 (1966).
57. The other method would be to characterize employee benefit assets when they
are granted by the employer regardless of vesting. Prior to vesting, however, the

employee does not have a property right, but only an expectancy which can be lost
through the actions of either the employee or employer. See Williamson v. Williamson,

203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1962).
58. People v. Bejarano, 145 Colo. 304, 385 P.2d 866 (1961).
59. Small v. Bartyzel, 27 Wn. 2d 176, 177 P.2d 391 (1947); In re Coffey's Estate,
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munity nature of the funds used to pay each life insurance premium.
The separate or community ownership of the total proceeds of any
policy is then apportioned according to the ratio of separate to community funds used to pay the premiums. 60 This approach provides more
protection for a widow than is provided for her in those states where
the "inception of title" doctrine is used to determine the character of
the entire proceeds. 61 There the separate or community nature of the
entire proceeds is determined by the character of the funds used for
the initial purchase of a life insurance policy, with merely a right of
reimbursement for the amount of premiums paid with other funds. 2
Since the premiums paid by a Washington couple would probably be
from earnings, and would therefore be community property, and, in any
event would be presumed to be community property,6 3 the newly
arrived Washington wife is afforded protection by having a percentage
ownership in the insurance proceeds. To the extent that life insurance
policies are purchased with community funds, the proceeds can be
paid only to the wife or the decedent's estate in the absence of the express consent of the wife."
Because there is generally no build-up of rights or cash value in a
term policy, and all previous premiums have been expended solely for
the protection feature of the insurance, the character of the proceeds
of a term insurance policy should be determined by the character of
the last premium paid.6 If the last payment occurred in Washington,
the wife would then have the protection of the presumption that the
payment was made with community funds and therefore the entire
195 Wash. 379, 81 P.2d 283 (1938); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Skov, 51 F. Supp.
470 (D. Ore. 1943).
60. In re Coffey's Estate, 195 Wash. 379, 380, 81 P.2d 283, 284 (1938).
61. McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); In re Miller's
Estate, 44 N.M. 214, 100 P.2d 908 (1940); Jackson v. Griffin, 39 Ariz. 183, 4 P.2d
900 (1931); Toussant v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 147 La. 977, 86 So. 415 (1920);
contra, Parson v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 1159 (E). Tex. 1970).
62. Williams, Community Property; Life Insurance Application of the Inception of
Title Doctrine, 18 Sw. L.. 521 (1964).
63. Berol v. Berol, 37 Wn. 2d 380, 223 P.2d 1055 (1950). In re Brown's Estate, 124
Wash. 273, 214 P. 10 (1923).
64. California-Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Jarman, 29 Wn. 2d 98, 185 P.2d 494
(1947); In re Towey's Estate, 22 Wn. 2d 212, 155 P.2d 273 (1945); Occidental Life
Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27 (1937). But see WAsHr. REv. CoDE
§ 48.18.440(2) (1969) (presumption of consent when beneficiary is the "child, parent,
brother or sister of either of the spouses").
65. See Small v. Bartyzel, 27 Wn. 2d 176, 185, 177 P.2d 391, (1947) (dissenting
opinion).
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proceeds would belong to the community. The Washington Court refused to make a distinction between term insurance and insurance with
a cash value, however, so the new Washington wife has protection only
to the extent that proceeds are attributable to community property
premiums.6
There is one rather unique exception to the general rules used to
characterize the marital property interests of specific assets. The fedral government maintains that benefits under several of its insurance
programs remain the separate property of the insured regardless of the
nature of the funds used to pay the premiums.67 Similarly, all of the
insurance proceeds paid under a Veteran or National Service Life
policy will be included in the gross estate of the decedent for federal
estate tax purposes6 8 Neither statutory reform nor a different conflict
of laws approach will have an impact on these federal insurance benefits.
D. Tax Treatment
Although Washington's present characterization of property acquired
elsewhere does not significantly affect federal tax treatment, it does
work a relative hardship on newcomers as to Washington's inheritance
taxation.
Despite the characterization as separate, the property brought into
the state by the new domiciliary can be subjected to federal estate
taxes with about the same end result as if it were community property. This is because the marital deduction available to the married
separate property owner was designed expressly to equate the federal
estate tax treatment of separate and community property. The native
Washingtonian will pay federal estate taxes on only his one-half of
the community estate since he is taxed on property only to the extent

66. Small v. Bartyzel, 27 Wn. 2d 176, 177 P.2d 391 (1947). The dissenting opinion
is sharply critical of the majority's failure to attach significance to the term nature
of the insurance policy in the case. The dissenting justice argues that full value has
already been received for all premiums except the last and that only the last premium
has any significance in determining the character of the proceeds. Id. at 185, 177 P.2d
at 395.
67. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950); Fleming v. Smith, 64 Wn. 2d 181,
390 P.2d 990 (1964).
68. Rev. Rul. 56-603, 1956-2 Cum. Bunx. 601; Estate of L.C. Hunt v. United States,
59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 11,891 (D. Tex. 1959).
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of his interest therein. 69 On the other hand, the new Washington domiciliary with his separate property will be taxed on all his property,
but will be granted a deduction for the property passing to his wife,
with the deduction not exceeding one-half the decedent's adjusted
gross estate.70 Thus he will be granted a deduction approximately
equal to the amount that would not have been taxed at all had the
property been classified as community.
For Washington inheritance tax purposes, however, there is no marital deduction. Washington imposes inheritance taxation on all property
subject to its jurisdiction "which shall pass . . . to any person."' If
the deceased's property is characterized as community property, the
surviving spouse's one-half of the community is not subject to tax
because it simply continues to belong to the surviving spouse; the
property does not "pass" to him.72 If the decedent's property is characterized as separate, on the other hand, all of it will "pass" on his
death and be subject to tax.7 - For two neighbors living in Washington,
the one who acquired all of his property in New York will have all of
his property subjected to Washington's inheritance tax, while his neighbor, who has been a life-long Washington resident, will have only
one-half of "his" property subjected to the inheritance tax. 74
A new Washington domiciliary who learns that his property will
be taxed more heavily at death than that of his neighbors may seek
to convert his property to community property to gain the favored
tax treatment. If he consciously converts his separate property into
community property through a community property agreement, however, he will have given his wife a one-half interest in what was previously entirely his, and consequently will have made a taxable gift
for both federal and Washington gift tax purposes." The impact of
69. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2033; United States v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297 (9th Cir.
1954).
70. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056.
71. WAsH. REV. CODE § 83.04.010 (1961); see State v. Clark, 30 Wash. 439, 71 P. 20

(1902); In re White's Estate, 42 Wash. 360, 84 P. 831 (1906).
72.
73.

In re Coffey's Estate, 195 Wash. 379, 81 P.2d 283 (1938).
See note 71, supra.

74. In the hypothetical case, Washington's inheritance tax on the husband's separate
property of $125,000, if he left it to his wife, would be $4,250. If the lifetime earnings had
been accumulated in Washington instead, the inheritance tax on the husband's $50,000
(his one-half of the community) and $25,000 (his separate property he brought to
the marriage) would be $1,400. Both calculations are pursuant to WAsH. REv. CODE
§ 83.08.020 (1961) and assume two class A exemptions.
75. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2501 (1954); H. L. Damner, 3 T.C. 638 (1944);
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the federal gift tax is diminished somewhat by the gift tax marital
deduction"8 which is quite similar to the estate tax marital deduction,
the former being limited simply to one-half of the value of the property
passing to the donor's spouse.
From a planning standpoint there are several tax advantages which
result from having all the property classified as community property.
On the death of one of the spouses, both halves of the community
obtain as a new basis the value at the date of death, or the alternate
valuation date.77 This can greatly reduce any capital gains problems
which the surviving spouse might have had as to his or her property
on any subsequent sale. Also, the tax savings of the marital deduction
is dependent upon the non-acquiring spouse surviving the acquiring
spouse. 8 In most family situations and in the hypothetical case above,
if the wife predeceases the husband, the marital deduction is lost,
whereas if the property is community property, the federal estate tax
consequences do not depend on the order of the spouses' deaths. Lastly,
the Washington inheritance tax is lower because only the decedent's
one-half of the community is subject to the tax.' 9
As a practical matter gifts designed to put the couple on a par with
long-time Washington couples may go unreported to avoid the complexities of gift tax returns. Technically, however, there is a penalty
imposed in the form of the gift taxes for converting the out-of-state
earnings to the character they would have acquired had they been
earned in Washington.
III. THE CALIFORNIA APPROACH: EVOLUTION OF THE
QUASI-COMMUNITY PROPERTY CONCEPT
In considering how Washington might avoid the present inequities
imposed on new Washington domiciliaries, California's approach
should be examined.
WAsr. REv. CODE § 83.56.030 (1961). While a conversion by community property agreement would be a clearly definable gift, there is a possibility that a gradual, informal,
intermingling of property might not be considered to be a gift since a donative intent,
delivery and acceptance are not dearly ascertainable. Although donative intent is not
meant to be the basis for the gift tax, Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g) (1) (1958), some courts
have required it. H. Jones, 1 T.C. 1207 (1943).
77.

INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2523.
IxT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1014(b) (6); McCollum

78.

See INT. R v. CODE of 1954, § 2056.

76.

Cas. ff 9957 (D. Okla. 1958).

v. United States, 58-2 U.S. Tax

79. See note 74 and accompanying text, supra.
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After forty-seven years of litigation and legislation, ending in 1961,
California has evolved what appears to be a complete and workable
plan fairly and constitutionally to resolve the problems of treating the
new domiciliaries as much like existing natives as possible.
The California courts held in 1914 that land purchased in California
with funds acquired during marriage in a common law state retained
its separate property characteristics and was not changed merely by
being invested within California."
In 1917, however, the California Legislature began its long effort to
treat its newcomers fairly. It amended the California Civil Code definition of community property to include: 8 '
real property situated in this state and personal property wherever situated, acquired (by either husband or wife) while domiciled elsewhere, which would not have been the separate property
of either if acquired while domiciled in this state.
Thus, any married couple moving to California would have its property automatically converted to community property.
In 1934, in In re Thornton's Estate, 2 the California court was
asked to determine the constitutionality of the 1917 amendment itself,
apart from any question of retroactive application. A married couple
had moved to California from Montana after 1917 bringing property
which the husband had acquired in Montana. The husband died in
1927, leaving a will in which he attempted to dispose of all his property. The surviving wife claimed one-half of the property as her community property under the 1917 amendment. The court held the statute
unconstitutional because it disturbed the property rights of the new
California citizen thereby abridging "the privileges and immunities
of the citizen.""8 The court also held that the taking of the property
of one spouse and transferring it to the other because they changed
their domicile was an unconstitutional taking of property without due
process of law. One Justice, while agreeing with the basic constitutional
issue, argued in his dissent that the state had full power to control
the devolution of property on the death of its citizens, and merely

80.
81.
82.
83.
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In re Warner's Estate, 167 Cal. 686, 140 P. 583 (1914).
Ch. 581, § 1, [1917] Cal. Stat. (now CAL. Civ. CODE § 164 (West Supp. 1970)).
1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934).
Id. at 5, 33 P.2d at 3 (1934).
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relabeling the property as "community property" as part of the state's
control was not objectionable."4
In a contemporaneous case, a California widow was denied the
statutory share of her deceased husband's property to which she would
have been entitled in Indiana where the property was acquired. The
court found the wife's interest in her husband's property to be a mere
expectancy in Indiana and sustained the husband's disposition of his
separate property.8 5
Perhaps taking the hint offered in the dissenting opinion in Thornton,
the California Legislature in its next session attempted to remove the
constitutional infirmity by enacting Section 201.5 of the Probate
Code,"" dealing only with rights of succession upon the death of either
spouse.
Two problems arose in construing this statute. It mentioned only personal property, so it was held not to apply to California real estate.17
The statute also provided that upon the death of either husband or
wife, one-half of the property subject to the statute acquired by either
husband or wife would be subject to the disposition of the decedent.
The problem this provision created was that the wife, usually the
non-acquiring spouse, might die first and dispose of one-half of her
husband's property. Such a result took the statute out of the solely
successionary role the legislature intended because it directly affected
the ownership rights of the survivor in his own property. The California court found this statute unconstitutional to the extent that it
88
allowed the decedent to dispose of property of the survivor.
Following the California Law Revision Commission's recommendations, 9 the statute was amended in 195790 and in 196191 to resolve
84. Id. at 5, 33 P.2d at 3 (Langdon, J., dissenting).
85. In re O'Connor's Estate, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031 (1933). The wife could
not claim any benefits under the 1917 legislation because the property was brought to
the marriage by the husband, so it would have been his separate property even under
California law.
86. Ch. 831, § 1, [1935] Cal. Stat. (amended by 1957 and 1961 CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.5
(West Supp. 1970)).
87. In re Miller, 31 Cal. 2d 191, 187 P.2d 722 (1947).
88. Paley v. Bank of America, 159 Cal. App. 2d 500, 324 P.2d 35 (1958).
89. 1 CALiroPmA LAW REVSION Com issiox, RECOzmENATION m STuny RArnma
To RInHTS OF SURViv G Spousp nINPRoPmR
AcQumIr WE=IE Doiacrmn ErsEwnwx

(1956).

90. Ch. 490, §§ 1-4 [1957] Cal. Stat. (amended by

1961 CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.5

(West Supp. 1970).
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these problems. Section 201.5 was specifically amended to include
local real estate because, as the Law Revision Commission pointed out,
there was no reason for the Legislature to deny a surviving spouse the
benefit of the statute merely because the separate property from the
previous domicile was invested in California real estate. The revised
probate section also very carefully limits its application to one-half
the property in a decedent's estate so that there can be no testamentary
disposition of the survivor's property by the decedent.
Since the revised section already applied only on the death of the
owner of the out-of-state acquired property, the property would remain
his separate property during his life absent any commingling. People
dealing with him on a commercial basis will look to his separate property to determine his financial worth, so the revised statute expressly
provides that although one-half of the property subject to the section
will go to the surviving spouse, all of the property will be probated and
subject to the debts of the decedent.
The statute does not apply to real estate purchased in California
by a married person domiciled elsewhere unless the owner is actually
domiciled in California at his death. If the person is a Californian at
the time of death, California has a definite interest in controlling the
succession rights to the property, but the state has little interest in
the succession rights to a non-domiciliary's investment in California
real estate. The revised probate statute does not apply to the nondomiciliary, and his surviving spouse has the same right to elect to
take a portion of the real estate against the will as she would have had

CA. PROB. CODE § 201.5 (West Supp. 1970):
Upon the death of any married person domiciled in this State one-half of the
following property in his estate shall belong to the surviving spouse and the other
one-half of such property is subject to the testamentary disposition of the decedent,
and in the absence thereof goes to the surviving spouse: all personal property
wherever situated and all real property situated in this State heretofore or hereafter
acquired:
(a) By the decedent while domiciled elsewhere which would have been the
community property of the decedent and the surviving spouse had the decedent
been domiciled in this State at the time of its acquisition; or
(b) In exchange for real or personal property, wherever situated, acquired other
than by gift, devise, bequest or descent by the decedent during the marriage while
91.

domiciled elsewhere.

All such property is subject to the debts of the decedent and to administration
and disposal under the provisions of Division 3 of this Code.
As used in this section, personal property does not include and real property does
include leasehold interests in real property.
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if the real estate were located in the decedent's domicile at his death. 2
To avoid the situation in which the surviving spouse of a California
domiciliary could take under the will and in addition exercise her
statutory right to take against the will, the statute puts the surviving
spouse of a domiciliary to an election.93
The revision of the Probate Code included an additional section9"
designed to protect the rights granted the surviving spouse under Section 201.5 from various inter-vivos transfers made by the decedent
without adequate consideration. Common law jurisdictions typically
protect the surviving spouse's interest in her non-barrable share with
some restriction on her spouse's lifetime transfers of property.9 5 The
Law Revision Commission thought that the rights granted in Section 201.5 ought to be similarly protected from transactions such as
the following: the husband, to avoid the provisions of Section 201.5
and prevent his wife from receiving one-half of his accumulated savings, transfers all of his property to a living trust, naming his California neighbor as the trustee, with the income to be paid to the husband for life and the corpus to be distributed to X on his death.
To deal with such a situation the California Legislature enacted Section 201.8 of the Probate Code, 6 which protects the wife without unconstitutionally restricting the husband's lifetime control of his separate property. The Legislature had many interests to balance, and
the statute leaves wholly gratuitous transfers unaffected because of

92. CAL. PRoB. CODE § 201.6 (West 1957). The surviving spouse previously had
no interest in such real estate because the law of her husband's domicile would apply
the law of California in determining the status of real property situated there. Under
this statute the wife will have whatever interest is accorded her by the law of her
husband's domicile at his death.
93. CAL. PRoB. CoDE § 201.7 (West Supp. 1970).
94.

CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.8 (West Supp. 1970).

95. Sec note 9, supra.
96. CAL. PRoB. CODE § 201.8 (West Supp. 1970).
Whenever any married person dies domiciled in this State who has made a
transfer to a person other than the surviving spouse, without receiving in exchange
a consideration of substantial value of property in which the surviving spouse had
an expectancy under Section 201.5 of this code at the time of such transfer, the
surviving spouse may require the transferee to restore to the decedent's estate
one-half of such property, its value, or its proceeds, if the decedent had a substantial
quantum of ownership or control of the property at death. If the decedent has
provided for the surviving spouse by will, however, the spouse cannot require
such restoration unless the spouse has made an irrevocable election to take against
the will under Section 201.5 of this code rather than to take under the will. All
property restored to the decedents estate hereunder shall go to the surviving spouse
pursuant to Section 201.5 of this code as though such transfer had not been made.
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the constitutional problems of interfering with the owner's control of
his Section 201.5 separate property during his lifetime. The statute
does not affect transfers for which property of a substantial value is
received, as this new consideration itself would be subject to Section 201.5, since by its terms Section 201.5 property includes property
exchanged therefor. The California Law Revision Commission Study
and Recommendation 97 indicated that the purpose of Section 201.8 is to
set aside transfers made without adequate consideration of substantial
worth where the transfers are of the typical will-substitute variety,
such as life insurance, joint tenancy assets, Totten trust bank accounts,
revocable trusts, trusts with the income reserved for life, and legal
transfers with a retained life estate. Thus the statute's main target is
the spouse who seeks to retain a substantial interest in Section 201.5
property during life while defeating his spouse's rights in the property
at his death by having the assets pass outside his probate estate.
Only one-half of a transfer, governed by Section 201.8, is set aside
because the decedent has the right under Section 201.5 to devise "his"
one-half by will. The transfer should be considered effective as to the
amount he could have given by will. The one-half restored to the
surviving spouse must, however, pass through the decedent's estate
in order to make it available to the decedent's creditors. The application of the statute is limited to Section 201.5 property in which the
surviving spouse had an expectancy at the time the transfer was made,
in other words, when the couple was already domiciled in California.
The net impact of the 1957 California revision was that property
acquired by a couple domiciled in a common law jurisdiction, and
which would have been community property if it had been acquired
in California, remained separate property when the couple brought
it to California for most purposes. For purposes of succession rights,
inheritance taxation, and probate homestead, however, the property
was treated substantially like community property, so that in these
areas the surviving spouse was treated as much like a native Californian as possible. This result probably conforms to the parties' intent,
and, in addition, avoids the substantial constitutional problems involved in attempts to legislatively convert separate property into community property.
97. See note 89, supra.
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Shortly after the 1957 revision, the California Law Revision Commission suggested that the label "quasi-community property" be applied to all "property [of California domiciliaries] acquired other than
by gift, devise, bequest or descent during the marriage by a married
person while domiciled elsewhere." ' It was suggested that this could
be the shorthand label for such property which was separate, but which
under certain statutory provisions would be treated more nearly like
community property. It was also suggested that the quasi-community
property concept be extended to the areas of divorce and separate
maintenance, lifetime declaration of homestead, and gift taxes.9 9 These
suggestions were followed. The label "quasi-community property" now
appears in California legislation and is widely used in legal writings
in California; in addition, the concept was extended to these other
0

areas.1

California's quasi-community concept has had little effect on federal
estate and gift tax consequences. Quasi-community property is still
basically the separate property of the person who acquired it despite
the expectant rights which Section 201.5 gives the surviving spouse.
The federal estate tax will be applied just as it would have been in
the common law state where the property was acquired. The marital
deduction designed to equate the tax impact on separate and community property will be available since the surviving spouse's interest in quasi-community property is a mere expectancy similar to
her non-barrable share in the common law state.101 Similarly, a gift of
quasi-community property by the owner to his spouse will be treated
as a gift of the owner's separate property for federal gift tax purposes
and will also be able to qualify for the marital deduction. 02 Since the
property is still treated as the separate property of one of the spouses,
the other spouse may consent to being treated as the donor of one-half
the property for gift tax purposes, when the gift is to a third person. 1 3

98. CALiFoRNIA LAW REVIION Comnissiox, Rcoin
ATION AN S~uDy RELATRo
TO INTER VXVOS MA=AL PROPERTY IUGTS n- PROPERTY AcQum
IR
W=IE DomcnEn

ELSEWHERE 1-6 (1960).
99. Id. at 1-7-11.
100. CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 140.5-149, 176, 1237-5, 1238, 1265 (West 1961); CAL. PROB.
CODE, §§ 661, 663 (West 1961); CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE, §§ 15300-15306 (West 1961).
101. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(c)-2(c)(1) (1958).
102. Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(f)-I(i) (1958).
103. Treas. Reg. § 25.2513(a)(2) (1958).
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Thus all the federal estate and gift tax devices to equalize the treatment of separate and community property are still applicable to California's quasi-community property, and the new Californian will have
almost the same net tax result as the native Californian.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR WASHINGTON
Washington could simply do nothing about the problem. In many
cases it does not arise, since the husband adequately provides for his
wife. The surviving wife will still incur an inheritance tax penalty,
however, since the property is taxed in full as her husband's separate
property, while property earned in Washington is taxed at half its
value, since the wife already owns one-half of it.
Although many couples avoid the problem by agreements or by
commingling their property, Gulstine's Estate'"4 indicates that the
husband could totally disinherit his wife as to all of his property which
was still traceable to his separate property.
One possible solution for Washington might be the suggestion posed
by Professor Marsh for solving this problem in all community property
states. 105 He would have each community property state recognize the
wife's non-barrable share under the law of the common law jurisdiction.
In other words, common law separate property would maintain its
common law separate characteristics in Washington, and would not
become separate property in the community property sense. Assuming
in the original hypothetical that the New York laws would entitle the
wife to a non-barrable claim to a one-third interest in the property
which her husband owned at his death, when he died in Washington,
the wife would claim that she was entitled to this one-third of all the
property which was acquired during the couple's domicile in New
York. Professor Marsh would resolve the case as follows:10
Her claim to a share of the . . . [holdings] of the husband free
from his attempted testamentary disposition . . . [would be]

characterized as an issue of marital property by the community
property state, and the choice-of-law rule refers the court to the
104.
note 39
105.
106.
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In re Gulstine's Estate, 166 Wash. 305, 6 P.2d 628 (1932). See discussion at
and accompanying text, supra.
MARSH at 228-33.
Id. at 228.
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law of the first domicile as the governing law. By that law, she ...
[would be] entitled to ...[one-third] of the husband's [holdings
at death] despite his attempt to bequeath the property to a third
person. Therefore, it would seem that by applying this law, the
wife should prevail.
In the original hypothetical, the wife would take $41,666, representing
one-third of the $125,000 estate.
If the Washington court were willing to take this approach, the disinheritance problem would be solved, and the wife's only complaint
would be that the benefits granted her under the law of the previous
jurisdiction were less than those granted the wife under the community
property laws of Washington. There are several practical objections
to having Washington courts adopt Professor Marsh's judicial solution, however. First, the Washington court has traditionally treated
a wife's claim against her deceased husband's property as a question
of succession rights.10 7 Although the marital rights approach would
allow the court to look to the state of acquisition to determine the
rights of the surviving spouse, it is doubtful that the court would
approve such a fundamental departure from existing precedent.
Second, Professor Marsh's approach would require the court to
look to the laws of each of the forty-two common law states and
even the laws of the seven other community states to the extent their
laws differ from Washington's. Since the "foreign" law would be the
governing law, the Washington widow whose husband acquired his
property in one jurisdiction might receive outright one-third of the
property on his death, while the Washington widow whose husband
earned his living in another might receive a life estate in her husband's
property upon his death. In short, there would be one law for lifelong
residents, and forty-nine different laws for those couples who move to
Washington. This would certainly be undesirable when one of the
primary purposes of reform in this area must be to equalize the positions of the new Washington couple and the native couple. Furthermore, from a practical standpoint it would be difficult for Washington
attorneys, judges and title insurance companies to familiarize themselves with the laws of each of forty-nine foreign jurisdictions.
107. In re Gulstine's Estate, 166 Wash. 305, 6 P.2d 628 (1932); Myers v. Vayette,
146 Wash. 1, 261 P. 647 (1927); Meyers v. Albert, 76 Wash. 218, 135 P. 1003 (1913).
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Finally, since the judicial solution grants the wife a non-barrable
share, the property passing to her would be subject to Washington
inheritance tax,108 resulting in a tax penalty for having acquired the
property outside the state.
Since the judicial solution is inadequate, it is suggested that the
Washington legislature consider adopting California's quasi-community property approach. Washington's version of quasi-community
property need not be as broad as California's, since the Washington
wife whose husband acquired separate property outside the state is
already protected in the divorce and homestead areas by having the
separate property of the husband included in the funds available for
the wife's protection and welfare. °9 It is California's extension of
the quasi-community property concept to fields outside the succession
and related tax areas that has drawn the most criticism,"' so the
quasi-community property concept in Washington can be appropriately limited. Except in one area of succession rights, the California
approach has been tested, so that Washington has the advantage of
California's extensive judicial and legislative background. The one
untested area is California Probate Code Section 201.8, which is
designed to protect the succession rights in quasi-community property from those lifetime transfers which would have defeated the
surviving spouse's rights in the quasi-community property. While it
is arguable that the statute imposes an unconstitutional restraint on
the husband's separate property during his lifetime, the state's interest in the welfare of the surviving spouse and its unquestioned
authority to determine the succession rights of its domiciliaries should
be sufficient to uphold the statute if it restricts only those lifetime
transfers, usually characterized as will-substitutes, in which the husband retains some lifetime benefits and attempts to defeat the surviving spouse's interest in the quasi-community property. In addition,
since the statute applies only after the marriage is terminated by
death, the situation is analogous to the application of the quasi-com-

108.

WAsH. REv. CODE § 83.04.010 (1961).

109. See notes 53, 55 and accompanying text, supra.
110. Cooper & Moore, Alice in Wonderland: A Glimpse at Two Aspects of the
Quasi-Community Property Problem, 41 L.A. BAR BuI.. 565 (1966); de Funiak, Conflict
of Laws in the Community Property Field, 7 ARIuz. L. Rav. 50 (1965); Schreter,
Quasi-Community Property in the Conflict of Laws, 50 CA.ia. L. REv. 206 (1962).
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munity property concept on the termination of marriage by divorce,
already upheld by the California courts."'
In conclusion, it is suggested that the Washington legislature consider for enactment the statutes set out in the Appendix. The proposed
statutes are substantially similar to California's and would apply the
quasi-community property concept to succession rights, and equalize
the inheritance and gift tax treatment of quasi-community property.
APPENDIX
AN ACT relating to succession rights of surviving spouses; adding
four new sections to Chapter 11.04 RCW; and providing an effective
date.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON:
NEW SECTION. Sec. 016
Upon the death of any person domiciled in this State one-half of
the following property in his estate shall belong to the surviving spouse
and the other one-half of such property is subject to the testamentary
disposition of the decedent, and in the absence thereof, shall descend
and be distributed according to the provisions of this chapter applicable
to the separate estate: all personal property wherever situated and all
real property situated in this state heretofore or hereafter acquired:
(a) By the decedent while domiciled elsewhere which would have
been the community property of the decedent and the surviving spouse
had-the decedent been domiciled in this state at the time of its acquisition; or
(b) In derivation or exchange for real or personal property, wherever situated, acquired other than by gift, devise, bequest or descent
by the decedent during the marriage while domiciled elsewhere. All
such property is subject to the debts of the decedent and to administration and disposal under the provisions of Title 11 of this code.
As used in this section, personal property does not include, and real
property does include, leasehold interests in real property.
NEW SECTION.

Sec. 017

Upon the death of any married person not domiciled in this state
who leaves a valid will disposing of real property in this state which
111. Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d $98, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1969).
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is not the community property of the decedent and the surviving
spouse, the surviving spouse has the same right to elect to take a
portion of or interest in such property against the will of the decedent
as though the property were situated in the decedent's domicile at
death. As used in this section, real property includes leasehold interests in real property."'
NEW SECTION.

Sec. 018

Wherever a decedent has made a provision by a valid will for the
surviving spouse and the spouse also has a right under Section
11.04.016 of this code to take property of the decedent against the
will, the surviving spouse shall be required to elect whether to take
under the will or to take against the will unless it appears by the will
that the testator intended that the surviving spouse might take both
under the will and against it.
NEW SECTION.

Sec. 019

Whenever any married person dies domiciled in this state who has
made a transfer to a person other than the surviving spouse, without
receiving in exchange a consideration of substantial value, of property
in which the surviving spouse had an expectancy under Section
11.04.016 of this code at the time of such transfer, the surviving
spouse may require the transferee to restore to the decedent's estate
one-half of such property, its value, or its proceeds, if the decedent
had a substantial quantum of ownership or control of the property at
death. If the decedent has provided for the surviving spouse by will,
however, the surviving spouse cannot require such restoration unless
the surviving spouse has made an irrevocable election to take against
the will under Section 11.04.016 of this code rather than to take under
the will. All property restored to the decedent's estate hereunder
shall go to the surviving spouse pursuant to Section 11.04.016 of this
code as though such transfer had not been made.
The effective date of this act is
AN ACT relating to the inheritance and gift taxation of property
acquired while domiciled outside the state; adding three new sections
to title 83 RCW; and providing an effective date.
112. This section is added to give the surviving spouse the same protection she would
have had if the property were in the decedent's domicile, since she has no protection
under community or quasi-community rights which are extended only to domiciliaries.
Washington has no interest in non-domiciliaries, and the surviving spouse's rights should
be determined under one set of laws, so Washington can defer to the law of the other
jurisdiction where the surviving spouse will have some protection.
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Washington and the Non-native Wife
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON:
NEW SECTION. Sec. 04.011
The one-half of any property which, under Section 11.04.016 of
this code belongs to the surviving spouse, and all of any property
restored to decedent's estate under Section 11.04.019 of this code are
not subject to the inheritance tax imposed by this title, provided,
however, that all of any property in the decedent's estate to which
Section 11.04.019 of this code is applicable passing to anyone other
than the surviving spouse is subject to the inheritance tax imposed by
this title.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 56.035
In the event of a transfer by gift of property from one spouse to
the other spouse, one-half of the following property which has been
transferred shall not be subject to the gift tax imposed by this title:
property acquired by the donor spouse while domiciled elsewhere which
would have been the community property of the donor and donee
spouse had the donor been domiciled in this state at the time of its
acquisition, or any property acquired in exchange therefor.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 56.036
In the event of a transfer by gift, if both spouses so elect, a transfer
of the following property may be treated for purposes of gift taxation
under this title as having been made one-half by one spouse and onehalf by the other: property acquired by the donor spouse while
domiciled elsewhere which would have been the community property
of the donor and the electing spouse had the donor been domiciled
in this state at the time of its acquisition, or any property acquired
in exchange therefor.
-3
The effective date of this act is
113.

The taxation reform is drawn to affect only quasi-community property.
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